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The correct definition of the product market and of the geographic market is a prerequisite for assessing market
structures in antitrust cases. For hospital markets, both dimensions are controversially discussed in the literature.
Using data for the German hospital market we aim at elaborating the need for differentiating the product market
and at investigating the effects of different thresholds for the delineation of the geographic market based on
patient flows. Thereby we contribute to the scarce empirical evidence on the structure of the German hospital
market. We find that the German hospital sector is highly concentrated, confirming the results of a singular prior
study. Furthermore, using a very general product market definition such as “acute in-patient care” averages out
severe discrepancies that become visible when concentration is considered on the level of individual diagnoses.
In contrast, varying thresholds for the definition of the geographic market has only impact on the level of
concentration, while the correlation remains high. Our results underline the need for more empirical research
concerning the definition of the product market for hospital services.
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Many hospital markets are undergoing structural changes.
In those countries in which patient choice and competition
between providers are fostered, merger control is a
predominant and controversially discussed issue. Especially
the adequacy of hospital market definitions is frequently
disputed. These definitions are nontrivial, as both dimen-
sions – the product and the geographic market – need to
be correctly specified. The denied merger between two
NHS Foundation Trust Hospitals in southern England [1]
and the controversy around three approved merger cases in
the Netherlands [2] are very recent examples. In Germany,
questions around the correct definition of the product and
geographic market have puzzled the antitrust authorities
[3], government advisory bodies [4,5], courts [6] and
economists [7] for many years. As we will show, consensus
on the correct approach has not yet been achieved.
Over the past decade, the German hospital market
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origconsiderable mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity,
affecting the structure of the hospital market, access to
care and the power balance between hospitals and
insurers considerably. Intensified by payment reforms and
other factors – such as shrinking financial resources of
municipalities owning public hospitals and a pro market
attitude in health politics – hospitals’ self-conception has
been transformed [8,9]a. They became – and to some
extent were forced by these external factors to become –
players in the health care market, built up management
skills and started to make strategic decisions to improve
their financial performance and their customer base.
Thus, M&A activity could be observed both on a local
level, forming hospital systems with a small number of
hospitals, and on a supra-regional level, forming hospital
chains that are active in various local hospital markets
across the country. Although the German Antitrust
Authority oversees M&A activity in the hospital sector,
there are concerns that this may not prevent highly con-
centrated hospital markets that would allow to exercise
market power [10]b.
Making use of data on the German hospital market, this
paper addresses focal issues regarding the definition of thes is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly credited.
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the product market definition assumes a cluster market, i.e.
summarizing all hospital services under the label “acute in-
patient care”. We discuss the limitations of this definition
and provide evidence that important information is omitted
by this approach thereby supporting the approach taken by
the English antitrust authorities in the aforementioned case.
We split up the product market using exemplary diagnoses,
for which we only consider hospitals as competitors which
offer treatment in the respective diagnoses. Furthermore,
the size of geographic hospital markets is frequently driven
by arbitrary thresholds. We test the robustness of our
results over a range of different threshold combinations.
This study contributes to the existing literature in the
following ways. Firstly, the analysis provides empirical
evidence on the effects of varying product market defini-
tions on the level of measured concentration, emphasizing
the urgent need for more empirical research on this issue
[11,12]. Secondly, the robustness of definitions of the
geographic market is tested over a number of threshold
combinations. Thirdly, this is only the second comprehen-
sive analysis of the German hospital sector that accounts
for hospitals’ system membership, an often neglected but
important issue as hospitals owned by the same entity do
not compete with each other.
In the following, we provide a review of concepts, as
various methodological issues regarding the definition of
the relevant market and their relevance for the situation in
Germany have not yet been sufficiently explored. In the
next section, we describe the dataset and compare it to the
dataset of the Federal Statistical Office. Furthermore, we
discuss our approach to define the relevant product and
geographic market and explain the calculation of the
indicators for market concentration. Thereafter we present
the results, followed by a discussion of the implications and
limitations of this study in the last section.
Review of concepts
We identify three strands of literature that are relevant to
our work: studies on the definition of the product market,
literature on the definition of the relevant geographic
market and analyses of the dynamics and the structure of
the German hospital market. We will not cover general
theoretical or empirical studies on hospital markets as these
primarily refer to the U.S. and have already been extensively
reviewed elsewhere [12-16].
If the relevant market is adequately defined, it includes all
relevant substitutes in the product as well as in the
geographic dimension. The most common tests for both
dimensions rely on the analysis of marginal price changes
and their effect on demand [17]. In hospital markets,
however, most patients are covered by health insurance and
thus less susceptible to any changes in prices. Furthermore,
prices in the health sector are rarely outcomes of marketprocesses but are set or at least controlled by regulatory
entities. This is also true for the German hospital market;
patients are fully insured by the Statutory Health Insurance
and prices are set by a system based on DRGs reflecting
average costs. Thus, alternative approaches are required.
Definition of the product market
Besides the stance that there is one general market
(cluster market) for acute inpatient care, there are three
options to differentiate product markets that are
commonly discussed [7]:c. Firstly, product markets can
be separated by care level of the hospital, i.e. a diffe-
rentiation between hospitals offering basic services,
intermediate services and highly complex specialized
services. Opponents argue that this is not feasible as
there is too much overlap between these categories.
Secondly, it is possible to distinguish between specialty
departments. However, this separation is by no means
binding. In many cases department structures just reflect
organizational deliberations, while the allocation of spe-
cific conditions or diagnoses can vary between hospitals.
Thirdly, each diagnosis can potentially be seen as a
separate product, as patients seek care for a specific
condition and cannot substitute this care by treatment
for another condition. The latter is typically criticized
for being far too narrow and not reflecting reality.
Inappropriate market definitions may result in misguided
decisions by antitrust authorities and biased research
results. Following Zwanziger et al. we argue that many
hospitals do not compete for generic acute care patients,
but e.g. for orthopedic or cardiac patients [11]. This is due
to various reasons, such as that they simply do not offer the
other service or that their profit margin or level of expertise
is higher for one than for the other. As Lindrooth illus-
trates, summarizing all types of hospital services under one
product market definition may create misleading depictions
of the reality [12].
Zwanziger et al. favor an approach that considers
supply-side substitutability, i.e. the ability of hospitals to
employ physicians and facilities for different groups of
diagnoses or procedures [11]d. Varkevisser et al. sugest a
similar approach for the Dutch setting [18]. In a
practical application, the Office of Fair Trading and the
Competition Commission have analyzed the merger of
two NHS Hospital Foundation Trusts by differentiating
more than thirty (sub-)specialties as well as separating
elective, emergency and out-patient services. Extensive
primary data collection was conducted, including in-
depth interviews with all involved stakeholders to find a
definition of the product market that fits this very
specific case [1]. However, to this date, this method has
not been evaluated in more detail and warrants more
research before a potential application to the German
hospital market can be considerede.
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merger control practice as well as in research is the cluster
market, i.e. some sort of “general acute care hospital
services” (p. 1423) [13]. This is true for the U.S. and for the
Netherlands but to some extent also for Germany, where
the Antitrust Authority for various reasons is still reluctant
regarding a considerable disaggregation of the product
market [19].
Definition of the geographic market
Concerning the geographic dimension, some analyzes rely
on geopolitical boundaries. However, it is obvious that these
boundaries do not necessarily match with real hospital
markets. Furthermore, two hospitals just next to each other
but on opposite sides of a district border would be classified
as not competing against each other. The analysis of
patient-flow data has proven to mitigate some of these
problems and to be a pragmatic and reliable – while by no
means perfect – approach. By looking at patient flows, one
can either aim at identifying rather self-contained areas (e.g.
following the Elzinga-Hogarty approachf) or at identifying
the relevant catchment/distribution area. In the latter case,
the analysis usually starts with a very small geographic area
which is step by step enlarged until the marginal increase
of patients that patronize the respective hospital is below a
certain threshold or a sufficiently large share of the patients
treated by the hospital are covered. To do so either circles
with incrementally increasing radii can be drawn around a
hospital or small geographic units like ZIP code areas can
be successively added. Using small geographic units is
superior to circular methods as this approach allows for
more flexible markets that align to real infrastructure and
settlement patterns. However, the decisions on the levels of
these thresholds cannot be backed up by sound theoretical
arguments. This implies that at least some sensitivity
analyses are required to evaluate the robustness of the
results when thresholds are varied. These approaches as
well as variations thereof are explained, analyzed and
discussed in more detail in studies such as [11,20,21].
Recent approaches based on hospital choice models are
much more demanding on the data available and are prone
to criticism such as strong assumptions regarding the direct
proportionality between price and time elasticities
[12,18,21]. To discuss or to implement such a method is
beyond the scope of the current study. However, compared
to such structural models, figures on market concentration
based on patient flows usually provide rather conservative
estimates, i.e. they underestimate the true market concen-
tration [22].
Summing up, for both product market and geographic
market definition the first best approach can hardly be im-
plemented in the hospital sector. Although some “common
practice” has emerged over time, there is no consensual
gold standard for either dimension of market definition.The core consensus remains, that more theoretical and
empirical research is required. Turning now towards the
available evidence regarding the German hospital sector
this need is even more emphasized.
The German hospital sector
In 2011, the expenditures for hospital services in Germany
totaled 77 billion euros or 26% of all health expenditures.
The capacity in terms of hospital beds has been fairly
constant since 2009 at around 502,000 beds. In the past
years a continuous increase of in-patient cases is observ-
able, i.e. between 2005 and 2011 the number of in-patients
increased by 11% from 16.5 to 18.3 million. This goes along
with a decreasing length of stay: The average length of stay
was around 7.7 days in 2011 compared to 8.7 days in 2005.
The complementary public funding on the basis of the
Hospital Financing Act has been declining for years, which
has caused the cumulative investment gap across all
German hospitals to grow to an estimated 15 billion euros.
For many providers severe economic difficulties are the
consequence. This may be one reason for the ongoing
M&A activities that change the structure of hospital
markets. The number of hospitals is decreasing, while the
number of hospitals which organize themselves in hospital
systems increases continuously [23].
In the context of these developments, concentration in
the German hospital sector is a topic being discussed –
although not excessively – in the pertaining legal and
economic literature, the record of decisions of the German
Antitrust Authority usually being the focal point of the
analyzes. However, neither courts and legal experts (e.g.
[19] or [24]) nor economists (e.g. [7] or [25]) have yet
reached a consensus on an appropriate product market
definition. The literature conveys the impression that most
experts feel that the cluster market approach applied by the
German Antitrust Authority may result in an incorrect
depiction of the true competitiveness of the market. At the
same time it is not clear, if this is really the case and which
alternative approach would be more suitableg. Most
arguments are supported by fictive scenarios that support
or respectively discourage the use of one method over the
other. Regarding the geographic dimension of the market
definition, the approach of the German Antitrust Authority
results in rather narrow markets, which most likely reflect
the regional nature of hospital markets [25]. However, at
the same time there is evidence that depending on the type
of the treatment needed, patients are willing to travel much
longer distances for some procedures than for others (see
also the findings presented in the results section.
Data and methods
One explanation for this ambiguity may be that there is
only scarce empirical evidence on the structure of the
German hospital market, because none of the available
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individual hospitals. Most authors refrain from creating a
hospital system identifier, but calculate concentration
measures based on individual hospitals as a proxy for true
market powerh. Hence, it is inherently assumed that hospi-
tals owned by the same entity behave like competitors. As
this is a very strong assumption, we use the study by
Schmid and Ulrich (SU) as a benchmark to our analysis
[26]i. This study was the first to look at the structure of the
German hospital market systematically accounting for
individual hospitals’ system membership. The results of SU
indicate that the German hospital market was highly
concentrated in 2007. Any attempt of measuring market
concentration on hospital level and thereby disregarding
system membership significantly underestimates the level
of concentration and potentially severely biases the results.
We use administrative data according to §21 KHEntgG
(hospital remuneration law) generated by the German
hospital payment system based on diagnosis related groups
(DRGs)j. The dataset contains each in-patient treatment
episode in Germany of the year 2007. Patient characteristics
such as age, gender, main and secondary diagnoses, proced-
ure codes as well as the ZIP code of residence are available.
Furthermore, the dataset covers information on hospitals
like ownership type, bed size, and teaching status. We
exclude hospitals with less than 50 beds. In most cases
these hospitals represent small specialist hospitals (e.g.Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the full sample and on diagn
Number of
patients
Number of
hospitals
Number o
hospital s
Total 16,561,426 1,517 910
Standard procedures
Nonsurgical procedures
PNEU** 200,618 1,294 759
STROKE** 1) 274,743 1,287 762
BIRTH 604,436 860 579
Surgical procedures
APP** 68,198 1,108 679
CHOL* 154,667 1,147 687
Orthopaedic surgical procedures
HAP 138,102 1,016 654
KAP 135,236 935 617
HIP*** 98,084 1,118 680
ENDO 371,422 1,207 728
Complex surgical procedures
AAA 8,210 386 305
CABG 2) 35,916 76 62
Notes: For diagnoses market with */**/*** more than 25%/50%/75% of all admission
from another hospital; 2)32% of all CABG patients were transferred from another ho
5%. PNEU - pneumonia; APP - appendectomy; CHOL - cholecystectomy; HAP - hip a
for HAP, KAP and HIP; AAA - intact abdominal aortic aneurysm; CABG - coronary artorthodontics, plastic surgery, ophthalmology) which are of
negligible relevance for the regular provision of hospital
services. To this dataset we merge the hospital system
identifiers as used by SU.
On the patient level we exclude accompanying persons,
patients without a coded main diagnosis, patients with a
missing or invalid ZIP code, and patients with a psychiatric
condition as main diagnosis. With these exclusion restric-
tions applied, our full dataset (TOTAL) comprises a total of
16.6 million patients treated in 1,517 hospitals or rather
910 hospital systems (see Table 1). The share of single
hospitals, i.e. hospitals which do not belong to a hospital
system, is 45%. For all calculations based on the full dataset
we use a 10% sample stratified on hospital and ZIP code
levels. Robustness checks have shown that there are no
significant differences between the results based on the 10%
sample and the full dataset.
As outlined in more detail below, when investigating
potential alternative definitions of the product market, we
create new datasets that only include patients with certain
diagnoses. These datasets are much smaller than the ori-
ginal dataset, so we can refrain from drawing a subsample
but use all observations available. To ensure data quality,
we apply further restrictions on these datasets: Patients
who are younger than 20 years are excluded for all diagno-
ses but BIRTH. Following the definition of Mansky et al.,
we exclude patients younger than 7 and older than 59 yearsosis based sub-samples
f
ystems
Share of single
hospitals (%)
Size of a hospital
system (mean)
Size of a hospital
system (SD)
45.0 1.67 2.25
42.4 1.70 2.11
42.9 1.69 2.04
52.0 1.49 1.56
45.8 1.63 1.96
44.3 1.67 2.08
49.5 1.55 1.90
51.3 1.52 1.77
45.0 1.64 2.05
44.9 1.66 2.16
69.9 1.27 1.07
69.7 1.23 0.73
s were emergency admissions; 1)13% of all stroke patients were transferred
spital. For all other diagnoses the share of transferred patients was less than
rthroplasty; KAP - knee arthroplasty; HIP - hip fracture; ORTHO - joint category
ery bypass surgery.
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hospitals with less than ten cases. Because of the lower
prevalence we exclude hospitals with less than three cases
in the provision of care for AAA patients. The notion
behind this approach is that these hospitals are of negligible
relevance for the provision of the respective hospital
services. They may need to treat those patients rather un-
expectedly in case of emergency.
As expected, standard procedures are more frequent than
complex surgical procedures. The number of hospitals
offering treatment for certain diagnoses varies considerably
(see Table 1). While almost all hospitals offer services for
PNEU, only 76 hospitals in our sample offer CABG. The
share of single hospitals does not differ markedly between
the conditions except for AAA and CABG, where still 70%
of all hospitals which treat patients in these conditions are
stand-alone hospitals. At the same time, AAA and CABG
are rather rare and complex conditions. It is plausible that
only few highly specialized tertiary care hospitals provide
these services and that within a hospital system the service
is likely to be concentrated in one facility.
To calculate concentration measures, we first have to de-
fine the product and geographic dimensions of the relevant
market. As basis for the product market we use all German
hospitals which offer “acute in-patient care” as our bench-
mark. It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a full
model for a differentiated product market along the lines of
Zwanziger et al. or Varkevisser et al. [11,18]. However, we
want to explore if more research into this topic is advised.
To do so, we test if a differentiation of the product marketTable 2 Inclusion and exclusion restrictions for the condition
Condition Incl./Excl. Diagnosis codes Pr
PNEU Incl. A48.1; J10.0; J11.0; J12.*; J13; J14; J15.*; J16.*; J17.*; J18.*
Excl. E84.*
STROKE Incl. I60.*; I61.*; I63.*; I64
BIRTH Incl. O00.* - O99.* 5-7
5–
APP Incl. K35.*; K36; K37 5-4
CHOL Incl. K80.*; K81.* 5-5
Excl. C* 5-5
HAP Incl. M16.* 5-8
Excl. M84.15; M96.0; S32.4; S72.0*; S72.1*; S72.2; T84.1
KAP Incl. M17.* 5-8
HIP Incl. S72.0*; S72.1* 5-7
5–
AAA Incl. I71.4; I71.02 5-3
CABG Incl. I20.*; I25.* 5-3
Excl. I21.*; I22.* 5-3
5–
Notes: The included diagnosis code is always related to the coded main diagnosis. The
If diagnosis code and procedure codes are specified, a patient is only included in the s
the international statistical classification of diseases (ICD-10-GM). Procedure codes are b
PNEU - pneumonia; APP - appendectomy; CHOL - cholecystectomy; HAP - hip arthr
aortic aneurysm; CABG - coronary artery bypass surgery.creates results that reflect the results of the standard prod-
uct market definition, since severe discrepancies between
the results would indicate that the use of an aggregated
measure is not appropriate.
To decompose the product market we identify ten diag-
noses that represent a wide range of hospital admissions,
covering nonsurgical and surgical procedures, standard and
complex as well as elective and emergency cases; i.e. pneu-
monia (PNEU), stroke (STROKE), birth (BIRTH), appen-
dectomy (APP), cholecystectomy (CHOL), hip arthroplasty
(HAP), knee arthroplasty (KAP), hip fracture (HIP), intact
abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) and coronary artery
bypass surgery (CABG). To capture the notion of supply
substitutability, i.e. providers can easily rededicate staff and
other resources between different types of treatment, we
also form one joint category ORTHO for the three
orthopedic treatments HAP, KAP and HIP (see Table 2)k.
Turning towards the geographic market, every hospital
system has a specific catchment area from which most of
its patients come from. This area is the relevant market,
which is unique for every hospital system (HS). The
procedure for defining the geographic market is based on
the cumulative-marginal rule used by SUl. The approach
analyzes patient flows on (five digit) ZIP code level. In the
first step, the cumulative-threshold is relevant. The relevant
market of a HS consists of the minimal number of ZIP code
areas needed to account for x% of all patients treated by
the HS (cumulative-threshold value). To get this, from a
HS point of view all ZIP code areas are sorted in descend-
ing order according to the number of the treated patientss
ocedure codes
20.*; 5–724; 5–725.*; 5–727.*; 5–728.*; 5–729; 5–730; 5–731; 5–732.*; 5–733.*;
738.*; 5–739.*; 5–740.*; 5–741.*; 5–742.*; 5–745.*; 5–749.*; 9–260; 9–261; 9-268
70.*
11.0*; 5–511.1*; 5–511.2*; 5–511.x; 5–511.y
11.3; 5–511.4*; 5–511.5*
20.0*; 5–820.2*; 5–820.3*; 5–820.4*; 5–820.x*; 5–820.8*
22.1*; 5–822.2*; 5–822.3*; 5–822.4*; 5–822.6*; 5–822.7*; 5–822.9*; 5–822.a*; 5–822.b*
90.*e; 5–790.*f; 5–793.*e; 5–793.*f; 5–794.*e; 5–794.*f; 5-820.0*; 5–820.2*; 5–820.3*;
820.4*; 5–820.x*; 5–820.8*
84.5; 5–384.6; 5–384.7; 5-38a.1
60.*; 5–361.*; 5–362.*; 5–363.*; 5–369.*
50.*; 5–351.*; 5–352.*; 5–353.*; 5–354.*; 5–355.*; 5–356.*; 5–357.*; 5–358.*; 5-35a.*;
359.*; 5–370.*; 5–371.*; 5–372.*; 5–373.*; 5–374.*; 5–375.*
exclusion restriction for the diagnosis code is related to the secondary diagnosis.
ample if in each category at least one code exists. Diagnosis codes are based on
ased on the German classification system for procedures.
oplasty; KAP - knee arthroplasty; HIP - hip fracture; AAA - intact abdominal
Table 3 Concentration for cluster market
N Mean p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
HHI 1517 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.39 0.55
MS 1517 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.26 0.42 0.59 0.73
CR3 1517 0.59 0.21 0.33 0.50 0.58 0.70 0.81 0.90
NC 1517 14.19 2 3 6 9 17 43 62
NZIP 1517 35.27 6 9 17 24 37 118 140
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(with the highest number of patients), every ZIP code is
added to the market until the cumulative number of
patients within the added ZIP code areas reach a defined
threshold. For example, with a threshold of 60% the
procedure stops, if the patients within the assembled total
ZIP code area cover 60% of the HS’s patient volume. In the
second step, the marginal threshold is considered. Add-
itionally to the ZIP codes that are identified by the cumula-
tive threshold, all ZIP code areas are added to the market
that account for at least y% of all patients treated by the HS
(marginal threshold). The reasoning behind this threshold
is that these areas are also important for the hospital system
as a sufficiently large number of patients come from these
ZIP codes. For example, if this threshold is set at 1%, every
ZIP code that is not yet covered under the cumulative
threshold but exceeds the critical number 1% of the HS’s
patients is also added to the relevant market. The result is
the 60/01-rule, which serves as our benchmark. As by
definition such thresholds are always arbitrary, we also look
at variations of the cumulative threshold at 40% and 80%
and use 3% and 5% as alternative marginal thresholds.
Subsequently, we calculate the market share for the
considered hospital system and its competitors. The market
share is defined as the number of a hospital system’s
patients in the relevant market divided by the total number
of patients in the relevant market. This results in the
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) which is defined as the
sum of all squared market shares of all competitors in the
market. The HHI is a measure for assessing market
concentration and can range from 0 to 1: Values close to
zero indicate that a HS operates in a market with high
competition and low concentration; values higher than 0.18
indicate that a HS operates in a market with less competi-
tion and high concentration [13]m.
Other proxies of market concentration are the market
share (MS), the number of competitors (NC), the cumula-
tive market share of the three (CR3) largest competitors in
the market and the number of ZIP codes (NZIP) that a
market comprisesn. For NC and – although rarely binding
– also for CR3 relevant competitors have to be identified.
In the study by SU a competitor is deemed to be a relevant
competitor when the respective hospital system treats more
than 3% of its patients in at least one ZIP code area of the
relevant market. Robustness checks with different thresh-
olds and alternative definitions are also conducted.
SU also apply this relevant competitor restriction when
calculating the HHI and the CR3. This means that the
squared market shares of potential competitors that are not
deemed relevant are not added to the HHI. This contra-
dicts the logic of the HHI, which takes into account the
limited significance of small competitors with small market
shares. For this reason, we deviate from SU in this point in
all of our calculations but the direct comparison of resultswith the benchmark study at the end of the results section.
Thus, unless otherwise stated, we calculate all HHI and
CR3 values including all hospitals as potential competitors.
In the current analysis we calculate all concentration
measures on the level of the hospital system (HS). However,
if we calculated the mean and the other statistical measures
of these concentration measures on the basis of these 910
hospital systems, the results would be distorted as the HHI
of a large hospital system would have the same weight as
e.g. a small stand-alone 60 beds hospital. To avoid this, we
follow SU and calculate all these measures on the basis of
all 1,517 hospitals, i.e. we weight all measures with the
number of hospitals per hospital system. All hospitals that
belong to the same hospital system enter the calculation
with the identical HHI that has been calculated on hospital
system level. By doing so, we give greater weight to larger
hospital systemso.
Results
General findings
Calculating the HHI based on the cluster market approach,
we obtain a fairly high average HHI of 0.19 (see Table 3).
With a HHI of 0.17, the median is just slightly lower. Look-
ing at the averages disguises the fact that a considerable
number of hospitals, i.e. more than 25% (HHIp75) of all
hospitals, operate in highly concentrated markets, even if
the higher threshold of the revised U.S. Federal Merger
Guidelines are applied. The high concentration is also
reflected both in the market shares (MS) of the hospital sys-
tems in their relevant market and in the corresponding
concentration ratio (CR3). The average market share is 27%
which means that on average a hospital system treats more
than one fourth of all patients in its relevant market. 25% of
all hospital systems have already a market share of at least
42% (MSp75). The concentration ratio (CR3) is on average
59%, meaning that on average three hospital systems treat
more than half of the patients. Hospitals are on average
confronted with 14 competitors (NC) with a median of 9
competitors in their relevant market, which on average
consist of 35 ZIP codes (NZIP) with a median of 24 ZIP
codes. Overall, the results of our analysis indicate that large
parts of the German hospital sector can be characterized by
very high levels of concentration.
In the current analysis we calculate all concentration
measures on the level of the hospital system (HS). Due to
Hentschker et al. Health Economics Review 2014, 4:28 Page 7 of 17
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/28the lack of appropriate data, existing studies perform their
analysis usually on the hospital level (H) (one exception is
the study of SU). Comparing the results of both ap-
proaches, average concentration is lower when measured
on hospital level, i.e. the average HHI (0.19 vs. 0.15), the
average market share (0.27 vs. 0.18), and the average
number of ZIP codes (35.27 vs. 22.19) decrease while the
average number of competitors and the average CR3 stay
roughly constant.
Although these differences are considerable, they still
disguise the full extent of the distortion. Most importantly,
the deviations average out. This is supported by the average
absolute difference between the HHI calculated on hospital
system level (HHIHS) and the HHI on hospital level
(HHIH). The mean difference of these two measures is
0.06, which is considerably higher than the respective
difference of the means, indicating that the difference of
the means is not able to capture this discrepancyp. When
looking at the correlation between the HHIHS and the
HHIH, we see a correlation of 0.58. This is a low correlation
considering that HHIHS and HHIH are frequently used as if
they were interchangeable measures.
Furthermore, in 2007, only about 45% of all hospitals
were still stand-alone hospitals and this figure is steadily
decreasing over time. This means that – comparing the
HHIHS with the HHIH only for these stand-alone hospitals
– the HHI is only different, if two or more competitors
belong to the same hospital systemq. The smaller the
number of stand-alone hospitals becomes, the worse is the
quality of HHIH as a proxy for HHIHS. If only hospitals that
belong to a hospital system are considered, the correlation
drops to 0.403. The scatter plot in Figure 1 shows the latter
scenario and provides a graphic illustration for the low
correlation. For contrast, also see Figure 2 (only stand‐aloner = .403
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Figure 1 Comparison of HHI based on hospital system level and on hhospitals without system membership, r = 0.88) and
Figure 3 (all hospitals combined, r = 0.58).
Summarizing, we argue that although used as a standard
measure in econometric studies on the German hospital
market, the HHIH is no good approximation of true market
concentration and that the HHIHS should be used instead.
Product market definition
We now disaggregate the product market, looking into a
number of individual diagnoses. Table 4 shows the average
concentration measure for every condition (see Table 5 for
comprehensive descriptive statistics). Looking at the HHI it
appears that only for HAP and KAP the HHI is in a similar
range as the HHI of the total market. For all other diagno-
ses, the concentration is considerably higher, ranging from
0.30 for STROKE to 0.56 for CABG. For most diagnoses
the HHI is just above 0.3. When testing for differences be-
tween HHIs for each diagnosis we have to reject the null
hypothesis that the means are equal. The correlations
between the HHI calculated on the basis of various sub-
samples are very heterogeneous. While some diagnoses seem
to be closely related, others differ considerably (see Table 6).
As the market share MS and the CR3 are reflected in
the HHI, it is little surprising that both indicators ex-
hibit a similar pattern as the HHI. Again, even when
complex procedures are not considered, the levels of
MS and CR3 reached in each of the subsamples is very
high and well beyond the thresholds that are used in the
German antitrust legislation to indicate highly con-
centrated markets with potentially negative effects on
competition. As expected, the number of competitors
NC is inversely related to the concentration indicators.
The number of ZIP codes is the only measure that de-
viates from the familiar pattern between the subsamples..6 .8 1
ospital level
ospital level (only hospitals that are part of a hospital system).
r = .877
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Figure 2 Comparison of HHI based on hospital system level and on hospital level (stand-alone hospitals only).
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http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/28Furthermore, a larger geographic market does not ne-
cessarily imply a lower degree of concentration. For a
complex procedure, such as a CABG, the relevant geo-
graphic market covers a large number of ZIP codes
while at the same time the concentration is very high.
The average linear distances measured in kilometers
that the patients travel to their hospital matches the pat-
tern of the NZIP.
Generally, the subsamples with complex procedures
exhibit significantly higher HHI values. Within the
standard procedures, there seems to be little difference
between surgical and nonsurgical procedures. However,
there is interesting variation within the orthopedic sur-
gical procedures. While the HHIs for the subsample onr = .582
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Figure 3 Comparison of HHI based on hospital system level and on hthe elective surgeries HAP and KAP is comparatively
low (0.19) the HHIs for HIP – which has a very high
proportion of emergency admissions – is much higher.
While the number of hospital systems is even higher for
HIP compared to HAP and KAP – thus prima facie sug-
gesting a similar level of competition – NZIP and the
distance indicate that for acute admissions the geographic
market is much smaller. These differences vanish once
all three subsamples are summarized in the category
ORTHO.
Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of the dis-
tribution of the HHIHS across different procedures.
When using the cluster approach for the product market
(TOTAL), 799 or 52% of the hospitals are located in.6 .8 1
ospital level
ospital level (all hospitals).
Table 4 Measures of concentration for different product market definitions based on hospital system (mean)
HHI MS CR3 NC NZIP Distance1) # of HS
Total 0.19 0.27 0.59 14.19 35.27 20.38 910
Standard procedures
Nonsurgical procedures
PNEU 0.34 0.46 0.74 8.41 23.53 12.23 759
STROKE 0.30 0.38 0.71 8.47 24.84 16.78 762
BIRTH 0.31 0.45 0.76 5.92 26.36 12.92 579
Surgical procedures
APP 0.33 0.47 0.72 8.73 23.75 15.19 679
CHOL 0.34 0.48 0.75 8.02 24.73 12.02 687
Orthopaedic surgical procedures
HAP 0.19 0.30 0.59 13.60 38.12 25.58 654
KAP 0.19 0.31 0.59 13.09 38.69 23.80 617
HIP 0.42 0.55 0.80 6.29 21.39 11.22 680
ORTHO 0.20 0.32 0.61 12.10 36.91 21.10 728
Complex surgical procedures
AAA 0.44 0.60 0.85 6.11 21.97 26.51 305
CABG 0.56 0.70 0.92 1.58 61.96 50.97 62
Notes: 1)Data was censored at the 99th percentile to eliminate extreme outliers. PNEU - pneumonia; APP - appendectomy; CHOL - cholecystectomy; HAP - hip
arthroplasty; KAP - knee arthroplasty; HIP - hip fracture; ORTHO - joint category for HAP, KAP and HIP; AAA - intact abdominal aortic aneurysm; CABG - coronary
artery bypass surgery.
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hospitals operate in highly concentrated markets. How-
ever, Figure 4 also shows a substantial variation in the
share of hospitals operating in highly concentrated mar-
kets when looking at the single conditions: For AAA
and CABG patients, 100% of the hospitals are located in
highly concentrated markets, while around 75% (85%) of
the hospitals treating patients with the nonsurgical pro-
cedures PNEU and STROKE (BIRTH) show higher HHI
than the 0.18 threshold. The surgical procedures APP
and CHOL are in similar concentrated markets with
75% and 85% of the hospitals, respectively. Slightly less
than 50% of the hospitals performing the orthopedic pro-
cedures HAP and KAP operate in concentrated markets.
For HIP the share increases to 85%, which is comparable
to the nonsurgical procedures. When we aggregate all
orthopedic procedures together (ORTHO), more than
50% of the hospitals are in concentrated markets. Even
HHIs way above 0.6 are a common observation.
The considerable discrepancies between these cate-
gories suggest that a highly aggregated cluster market
approach disguises severe and systematic differences on
a more detailed level. Although it is unlikely that a
differentiation on a granular ICD level is practical, more
research needs to be dedicated to this aspect. The
supply-side substitutability of services captured with
ORTHO and the differentiation between elective and
acute treatments seem to be promising starting points.Geographic market definition
So far, we only considered the 60/01-rule to define the
geographic dimension of the hospital market. As pointed
out above, there exists no theory based rule to choose
the thresholds. Hence, to check for the robustness of
our results, we vary the marginal values with 3% and 5%
and also consider cumulative thresholds of 40% and
80%.
Table 7 summarizes the results. Starting with the
40/01 rule, increasing the marginal threshold from 1%
over 3% to 5% leads to a decrease of the average
NZIP from 24.86 to 13.59. This goes along with a
reduction of the average NC from 11.06 to 8.01.
Inversely, the two concentration measures HHI and
CR3 increase from 0.21 to 0.28 and 0.61 to 0.69
respectively. Apparently there are a considerable num-
ber of ZIP code areas that contribute between 1% and
3% to hospitals’ patient volume. Considering the
cumulative thresholds of 60% and 80%, it is observable
that increasing the marginal threshold from 1% to 3%
has less effect the higher the cumulative threshold is.
This is even more the case for the increase from
3% to 5%. Hence, the cumulative threshold appears
to become increasingly binding; to reach the 80%
threshold at least in some cases very large numbers
of ZIP codes have to be included that account for
very small portions, i.e. less than 5% or 3%, of the
hospitals case volume.
Table 5 Concentration measures for single conditions
Condition N Mean p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
AAA HHI 386 0.44 0.20 0.21 0.29 0.40 0.57 0.78 1.00
AAA MS 386 0.60 0.19 0.33 0.45 0.58 0.75 0.88 1.00
AAA CR3 386 0.85 0.56 0.60 0.76 0.86 0.94 1.00 1.00
AAA NC 386 6.11 1 1 2 4 8 19 30
AAA NZIP 386 21.97 2 3 7 14 35 59 79
APP HHI 1,108 0.33 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.27 0.46 0.68 0.81
APP MS 1,108 0.47 0.09 0.16 0.29 0.45 0.65 0.82 0.90
APP CR3 1,108 0.72 0.41 0.47 0.62 0.73 0.84 0.94 0.97
APP NC 1,108 8.73 1 2 5 8 11.5 21 26
APP NZIP 1,108 23.75 5 8 14 21 29 52 77
BIRTH HHI 860 0.31 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.30 0.38 0.57 0.69
BIRTH MS 860 0.45 0.07 0.17 0.32 0.45 0.59 0.73 0.83
BIRTH CR3 860 0.76 0.39 0.54 0.68 0.78 0.85 0.94 0.97
BIRTH NC 860 5.92 1 2 3 5 7 15 18
BIRTH NZIP 860 26.36 6 9 15 23 29 73 96
CABG HHI 76 0.56 0.25 0.32 0.44 0.56 0.69 0.85 0.86
CABG MS 76 0.70 0.13 0.37 0.61 0.73 0.83 0.92 0.92
CABG CR3 76 0.92 0.73 0.80 0.90 0.92 0.96 0.99 1.00
CABG NC 76 1.58 1 1 1 1 2 3 4
CABG NZIP 76 61.96 21 27 36.5 47 68 154 154
CHOL HHI 1,147 0.34 0.07 0.11 0.21 0.32 0.44 0.68 0.82
CHOL MS 1,147 0.48 0.05 0.12 0.31 0.49 0.65 0.82 0.90
CHOL CR3 1,147 0.75 0.34 0.48 0.67 0.75 0.88 0.94 0.97
CHOL NC 1,147 8.02 1 2 4 6 9 28 36
CHOL NZIP 1,147 24.73 5 8 14 22 29 59 79
ENDO HHI 1,207 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.24 0.38 0.62
ENDO MS 1,207 0.32 0.03 0.06 0.19 0.30 0.44 0.59 0.72
ENDO CR3 1,207 0.61 0.28 0.35 0.50 0.60 0.72 0.86 0.93
ENDO NC 1,207 12.10 1 2 4 7 13 52 77
ENDO NZIP 1,207 36.91 5 9 16 23 32 164 240
HAP HHI 1,016 0.19 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.37 0.46
HAP MS 1,016 0.30 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.28 0.43 0.55 0.64
HAP CR3 1,016 0.59 0.26 0.37 0.49 0.59 0.70 0.83 0.90
HAP NC 1,016 13.60 2 3 6 9 15 53 75
HAP NZIP 1,016 38.12 5 8 18 26 35 148 245
HIP HHI 1,118 0.42 0.09 0.13 0.23 0.38 0.57 0.84 0.91
HIP MS 1,118 0.55 0.08 0.16 0.35 0.56 0.74 0.91 0.95
HIP CR3 1,118 0.80 0.42 0.53 0.72 0.83 0.92 0.97 0.98
HIP NC 1,118 6.29 1 1 3 5 8 15 20
HIP NZIP 1,118 21.39 4 7 12 18 26 51 70
KAP HHI 935 0.19 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.24 0.34 0.54
KAP MS 935 0.31 0.04 0.06 0.18 0.30 0.43 0.55 0.72
KAP CR3 935 0.59 0.25 0.36 0.48 0.59 0.70 0.83 0.90
KAP NC 935 13.09 2 3 6 8 14 51 70
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Table 5 Concentration measures for single conditions (Continued)
KAP NZIP 935 38.69 7 11 19 26 35 154 223
PNEU HHI 1,294 0.34 0.06 0.10 0.19 0.31 0.49 0.70 0.82
PNEU MS 1,294 0.46 0.03 0.08 0.24 0.46 0.67 0.83 0.90
PNEU CR3 1,294 0.74 0.30 0.45 0.64 0.77 0.87 0.94 0.98
PNEU NC 1,294 8.41 1 2 4 6 11 22 36
PNEU NZIP 1,294 23.53 5 8 14 20 27 60 81
STROKE HHI 1,287 0.30 0.07 0.10 0.18 0.27 0.38 0.57 0.79
STROKE MS 1,287 0.38 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.37 0.56 0.74 0.89
STROKE CR3 1,287 0.71 0.35 0.44 0.62 0.72 0.82 0.91 0.96
STROKE NC 1,287 8.47 1 2 4 7 11 20 28
STROKE NZIP 1,287 24.84 4 7 14 21 29 78 81
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tion of NC and NZIP is analyzed at in more detail (see
Table 8). The mean is mainly driven by a small but still
significant share of hospital systems that have a much
dispersed constituency. For those, the cumulative thresh-
old is binding and they require excessive numbers of
ZIP code areas to reach it. For example, when applying
the 80% cumulative threshold more than 5% of all hospi-
tals systems need at least 256 ZIP code areas to reach
this figure. A similar pattern can be observed for the
number of competitors. The median values for both in-
dicators are also susceptible to a change in the marginal
threshold but way less than the mean.
Again the HHI is much less sensitive to these effects.
For example, across all nine rules the 99% percentile of
the HHI ranges between 0.54 and 0.67. This is con-
firmed by Figure 5 in which hospitals are sorted accord-
ing to their HHI. Obviously, higher cumulative
thresholds and lower marginal thresholds tend to result
in smaller HHI values. However, contrary to the varia-
tions of the product market, the overall picture remainsTable 6 Correlation coefficients of HHI of different conditions
Condition AAA APP BIRTH CABG CHOL EN
AAA 1.00
APP 0.39 1.00
BIRTH 0.51 0.63 1.00
CABG 0.02 −0.04 −0.04 1.00
CHOL 0.43 0.76 0.72 0.03 1.00
ENDO 0.40 0.56 0.61 0.08 0.65 1.0
HAP 0.35 0.51 0.53 0.16 0.57 0.8
HIP 0.46 0.74 0.66 0.11 0.78 0.6
KAP 0.36 0.48 0.50 0.15 0.57 0.8
PNEU 0.43 0.75 0.70 0.06 0.83 0.6
STROKE 0.37 0.59 0.59 0.02 0.66 0.6
TOTAL 0.45 0.65 0.76 0.05 0.74 0.7stable. Furthermore, extreme spikes at the upper end of
the distribution as have been seen for NC and NZIP
cannot be observed.
Calculating the correlation between the HHIs based
on the nine different rules supports these findings. For
all potential combinations, the correlation ranges bet-
ween 0.70 and 0.99 (see Table 9).
So far, we determined the NC including all hospitals as
competitors which treat at least 3% of their patients in a
single ZIP code of the relevant market. Table 10 shows
how the NC varies if the threshold is modified. With in-
creasing market shares the NC declines. We think that
our approach produces a rather conservative figure with
a tendency to overestimate the number of relevant com-
petitors. The definition of NC has no effect on the re-
sults of HHI, MS and CR3.
Comparison with the benchmark study
We now want to test if the results are robust across data-
sets. The dataset used by SU is collected and provided by
the Federal and State Statistical Offices. The structure isDO HAP HIP KAP PNEU STROKE TOTAL
0
2 1.00
0 0.47 1.00
4 0.83 0.46 1.00
3 0.54 0.79 0.57 1.00
0 0.49 0.64 0.51 0.69 1.00
3 0.60 0.67 0.60 0.75 0.73 1.00
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Figure 4 HHI for subsamples by condition. Note: PNEU - pneumonia; APP - appendectomy; CHOL - cholecystectomy; HAP - hip arthroplasty; KAP - knee
arthroplasty; HIP - hip fracture; ORTHO - joint category for HAP, KAP and HIP; AAA - intact abdominal aortic aneurysm; CABG - coronary artery
bypass surgery.
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ting on the hospital level is conducted by the same ad-
ministrators. However, there is no formal documentation
that they actually do use exactly the same data source. As
the two datasets cannot be merged, we can only compare
descriptive statistics and the final results. The number ofTable 7 Variation of geographic market thresholds (means)
Rule HHI MS CR3 NC NZIP
40/01 0.21 0.29 0.61 11.06 24.86
40/03 0.26 0.36 0.68 8.52 15.35
40/05 0.28 0.38 0.69 8.01 13.59
60/01*) 0.19 0.27 0.59 14.19 35.27
60/03 0.23 0.33 0.64 12.50 28.84
60/05 0.24 0.34 0.65 12.21 27.95
80/01 0.17 0.24 0.55 22.24 64.86
80/03 0.19 0.27 0.57 21.50 62.56
80/05 0.19 0.27 0.57 21.38 62.34
Note: *) Benchmark scenario.hospitals is slightly higher in our dataset (1,517 vs. 1,439),
which is mainly due to two reasons: Firstly, while the data-
set of the Federal Statistical Office summarizes hospitals
with more than one site under one data point, we are able
to separate out individual sites. Secondly, in our dataset
fewer observations have to be deleted due to missing
values. The number of hospital systems is slightly lower in
our dataset (910 vs. 944) which is primarily due to a dif-
ference regarding the treatment of hospital systems that
operate in several states. While SU split hospital systems
by states to avoid excessive geographic markets, we refrain
from doing so as SU could show that there are no signifi-
cant differences in concentration measures when testing
the two options for robustness. Furthermore, the split of
hospital systems along state borders is arbitrary.
For the direct comparison we slightly amend our
approach to match exactly the procedure of SU. When
calculating the HHI and the CR3 we now only take
competitors into account that are deemed relevant as
explained in the data and methods section. Doing so, the
average HHI calculated on hospital system level is 0.17
Table 8 Distribution of NC and NZIP under varying
thresholds
NC
Rule p1 p5 p25 p50 mean p75 p95 p99
40/01 2 3 6 9 11 14 26 44
40/03 1 1 3 6 9 11 26 39
40/05 1 1 3 5 8 10 26 39
60/01 2 3 6 9 14 17 43 62
60/03 1 2 4 6 12 16 43 62
60/05 1 1 3 6 12 15 43 62
80/01 2 3 6 10 22 24 83 137
80/03 1 2 5 9 21 24 83 137
80/05 1 2 5 9 21 24 83 137
NZIP
Rule p1 p5 p25 p50 mean p75 p95 p99
40/01 6 9 17 23 25 29 58 61
40/03 3 5 8 10 15 16 54 61
40/05 2 3 5 7 14 15 54 61
60/01 6 9 17 24 35 37 118 140
60/03 3 5 9 13 29 34 118 140
60/05 2 4 7 13 28 34 118 140
80/01 6 9 18 29 65 74 256 355
80/03 3 6 13 27 63 74 256 355
80/05 3 5 12 27 62 74 256 355
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http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/28which is lower than the HHI of 0.19 in Table 3. SU anticipate
this effect of their calculation of the HHI and state that
they are likely to underestimate true market concentration.
Exactly replicating the method of SU we obtain the re-
sults shown in Table 11. All these results are in line withHHI=0.18
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Figure 5 HHI with varying definitions of the geographic market.SU. Only the number of ZIP codes on which the rele-
vant market is constructed differs slightly more. This
may be due to the higher number of hospitals in the
current sample and the decision to abstain from a state
by state split of hospital systems.
Discussion and conclusion
Looking at the product market definition our findings
support the hypothesis that an aggregated cluster market
approach neglects relevant information and is a ques-
tionable indicator for market concentration. Besides the
conceptual argument that it is unlikely that a small local
hospital is a relevant competitor across all fields for a
neighboring tertiary care provider, our results show that
there are considerable differences between different
diagnoses. Taking a rigorously static supply side pers-
pective one could argue that strong competition for hip
replacement surgery is no alleviation for high concen-
tration and therefore limited choice in the market for
cholecystectomies. But even from a perspective that fo-
cuses on potential substitutability on the supply side it
seems disputable to plainly summarize all diagnoses that
might be treated by the same type of specialist within
one category. For example, there is a considerable dis-
crepancy concerning the size of the geographic market
between elective and emergency admissions. However,
the size of the geographic market also varies substan-
tially in-between diagnoses that are characterized by a
very low proportion of emergency admissions. Further
research is needed to analyze if these differences are
driven by the willingness or by the capability of patients
to travel for a longer distance to an alternative hospital.
If – besides typical emergency admissions – other condi-
tions can be identified that are characterized by a very1517
1000 1500
 Hospitals
Rule 40/03 Rule 40/05
Rule 60/03 Rule 60/05
Rule 80/03 Rule 80/05
Table 9 Correlation coefficients of different cumulative-marginal rules
Rule 40/01 40/03 40/05 60/01 60/03 60/05 80/01 80/03 80/05
40/01 1.00
40/03 0.86 1.00
40/05 0.80 0.96 1.00
60/01 0.96 0.87 0.83 1.00
60/03 0.83 0.93 0.92 0.90 1.00
60/05 0.78 0.89 0.92 0.86 0.97 1.00
80/01 0.81 0.76 0.75 0.92 0.89 0.87 1.00
80/03 0.72 0.76 0.77 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.94 1.00
80/05 0.70 0.74 0.76 0.83 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.99 1.00
Table 11 Concentration measures for the whole hospital
sector
N Mean p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
HHI 1517 0.17 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.24 0.38 0.54
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ther segmentation of the product market beyond the
suggested treatment groups. The very low correlation
between the HHIs of the different subsamples and bet-
ween these and the cluster market HHI underlines that
the latter is only of limited use to approximate the mar-
ket concentration as experienced by the patient. Overall,
our results suggest that a generalizing cluster market ap-
proach is averaging out many of the severe differences
between diagnoses. They further stress the need for ad-
ditional research of this issue. Empirical literature on
this specific topic is scarce, especially as it was usually
not the most controversial aspect in merger control
cases that were overshadowed by disputes about the de-
lineation of the geographic market. The approach taken
by the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Com-
mission in England [1] seems to be reasonable but was
conducted as a comprehensive case study accommo-
dating the very specific situation of the two involved
hospitals, thus preventing the generalization of the ap-
plied product market differentiation .
In contrast, the analysis of the different cutoff values
concerning the definition of the geographic market
shows that the results are fairly robust. There are dif-
ferences regarding the level of concentration, but the
correlation is very high and the discrepancies are not as
dramatic as for the product market dimension. Again,
there is no theoretical basis for an argument in favor of
or against one threshold or the other. We argue that theTable 10 Number of (significant) competitors for different
definitions
Definition of significant competitor NC
3% in a single ZIP-code 14.19
10% in a single ZIP-code 5.87
1% in the whole relevant market 40.54
3% in the whole relevant market 25.61
10% in the whole relevant market 13.25
15% in the whole relevant market 10.4360/01 rule seems to be a pragmatic compromise. Both
the cumulative and the marginal threshold are binding
and it is assured that the relevant market reflects more
than half of a hospital systems patient volume while not
creating excessively large geographic markets for hos-
pital systems with an extremely wide catchment area. As
this group seems to be mainly constituted by highly
specialized hospitals, this may again interfere with the
debate about the correct specification of the product
market. Hence, while the correct specification of the
geographic market will continue to be a focal contro-
versy in merger control cases, it seems of limited rele-
vance in econometric studies when the HHI (but no
other measures like the size of the geographic market) is
used as control variable. Nonetheless, depending on the
scope of the analysis extensive robustness checks are
paramount.
Our results also underline the key findings of the study
by SU. We can confirm that the HHI calculated on hos-
pital level is a very poor proxy for true market con-
centration. A rather low correlation of 0.40 for HHIH
and HHIHS questions the econometric validity of such a
proxy. Concentration must be calculated on hospitalHHI* 1384 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.14 0.23 0.40 0.61
MS 1517 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.26 0.42 0.59 0.73
MS* 1384 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.23 0.40 0.60 0.77
CR3 1517 0.52 0.14 0.22 0.42 0.52 0.65 0.79 0.84
CR3* 1384 0.54 0.11 0.19 0.42 0.56 0.67 0.80 0.88
NC 1517 14.19 2 3 6 9 17 43 62
NC* 1384 13.39 2 3 6 9 15 37 61
NZIP 1517 35.27 6 9 17 24 37 118 140
NZIP* 1384 25.30 3 8 16 23 29 51 79
Note: *)Benchmark scenario.
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level of concentration that is measured across all our dif-
ferent rules and definitions, it seems very reasonable to
state that the German hospital market is indeed highly
concentrated. While Varkevisser and Schut [28] come to
a rather favorable assessment of the rigorousness of the
German merger control process – at least compared to
the Dutch approach – our results suggest that probably
an even stricter course might be advised.
The limited but very consistent evidence on high levels
of concentration in the German hospital market puts even
more responsibility on policy makers as they may have to
reassess some of their positions on the capabilities of se-
lective contracting and the extent to which patients can
actually freely choose their hospital.Endnotes
aThere have been fundamental changes in the German
hospital sector. In 2004 there was the introduction of a
new hospital payment system based on diagnosis related
groups (DRG). Prior to this reform, hospital services
were mainly reimbursed on a per diem basis. Now pay-
ment is linked to cases treated and reflects DRG specific
costs averaged across all hospitals within a state. This
implies that hospitals have to reduce costs below the
average to make profits.
bThis is because the authority only interacts if the
returns of the merging companies exceed a threshold of
500 million Euros which is usually not the case for local
and small regional hospital systems.
cFor a concise review regarding the controversy of the
product market definition applied by the German Anti-
trust Authority see Bangard [19], pp. 214–222, or Jansen
[24], pp. 158–201. Commonly, health care is considered
to be a differentiated product. This in combination with
heterogeneous preferences of patients allows for the
emergence of market power in the first place and estab-
lishes the need for a deliberate delineation of product
markets [13], p. 1411.
dThey call these groups service categories. Any phy-
sician offering treatment within this group could poten-
tially offer treatment for any other treatment within this
category. Furthermore, the categories are also differen-
tiated by the qualification level needed to perform these
treatments. For example, there is not only a category for
General Medicine, but also one for General Medicine
Cardiology, indicating that treatments within the latter
group require not only knowledge in General Medicine,
but further specialization in the field of Cardiology.
Sacher and Silvia apply this approach on two regions in
California and find that the cluster market approach
masks considerable variation on service category level
[29].eAs Varkevisser et al. point out, the product dimension
of the hospital market definition is usually much less con-
tentious. The authors state a “general lack of debate over
the relevant product market” ([18], p. 9). Gaynor and Vogt
also state the need for more research regarding the defi-
nition of the product market for hospital services [13].
fThe Elzinga-Hogarty approach seeks to identify an
area that minimizes exports from and imports into this
area below predefined thresholds. It is one of the most
common approaches in U.S. hospital merger control in-
vestigations and is to some extent reflected by the ap-
proach applied by the German Antitrust Authority [7].
However, the method requires a number of case specific
ad hoc assumptions to avoid implausible definitions of
the geographic market [11,13,22]. Therefore this method
is not well suited for the analysis of datasets with large
numbers of potential hospital markets.
gThis does not mean that individual authors did not
make statements. For example, Kuchinke and Kallfass
argue in favor of the cluster market approach [7] while
Jansen states that the cluster market assumption cannot
be applied to the hospital market [24]. Coenen et al. re-
main somewhat undecided [25].
hAs an example, Dewenter et al. 2013 attempt to
measure concentration by the number of beds and dis-
regard hospital system membership. They define circular
geographic markets [30]. Other studies face similar
problems [31].
iFor more information on the underlying research pro-
ject see Schmid [10].
jThe data was provided by the BKK Federal Association
(a health insurance association).
kWe focus on diagnoses that are closely connected to
a procedure as this helps to ensure good data quality.
For AAA we use diagnosis and procedure codes defined
by the German Federal Joint Committee in their quality
assurance agreement for this condition [32]. Diagnosis
and procedure codes for patients with hip fracture are
taken from the Federal Office for Quality Assurance
[33]. For the remaining conditions we use diagnosis and
procedure codes on the basis of the German inpatient
quality indicators [27]. For a full list of diagnosis and
procedure codes used to identify the above mentioned
conditions see Table 2.
lFor a detailed description of the procedure see [10],
pp. 110–112.
mUp to 2010 the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines
suggested the threshold of 0.18 as an indicator for highly
concentrated markets. For this reasons, almost all em-
pirical studies refer to this figure. After the revision of
the merger guidelines the scale was more differentiated,
classifying markets with an HHI between 0.15 and 0.25
as moderately concentrated markets. We stick to the
0.18 indicator as it resembles remarkably well the
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share of 30% or higher of the merged entity) and allows
for a direct comparison with prior studies.
nThe proxies MS and CR3 are closely related to
thresholds established in the German antitrust legisla-
tion. §19 GWB states that it can be assumed that a firm
has market power if its market share is at least 33% and
that a group of three (or less) firms has market power if
their accumulated market share reaches 50%.
oWe also conducted robustness checks with other
weights such as the number of patients treated, but the
results remained stable.
pIf looking only at hospitals that belong to a hospital
system, the difference increases to 0.091 (N = 834). As ex-
pected, with a delta of 0.027 the difference is much smaller
for the subsample of stand-alone hospitals (N = 683).
qIn consequence, when plotting the HHIH and the
HHIHS only for stand-alone hospitals in a scatter plot,
the dots are clustered very closely along the diagonal.
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